Publications |
Rational Preference in Transformative Experiences
L. A. Paul argues that some decisions are epistemically transformative in such a way that we cannot assign subjective value to the outcomes. She claims we cannot use traditional decision theory to make these decisions rationally. I argue that Paul fails to engage critically with traditional accounts of decision theory and, on closer inspection, it is not clear that her version of decision theory entails a tension between rational and authentic choice. Furthermore, if her contribution is instead to bring to light the importance of authenticity alongside rational decision-making, the definition she provides of authenticity in fact undermines her argument.
You can find the paper here.
A more public-facing version of my thoughts on Transformative Experience is featured here, on a philosophy of science blog called the The Crow's Nest.
You can find the paper here.
A more public-facing version of my thoughts on Transformative Experience is featured here, on a philosophy of science blog called the The Crow's Nest.
Review of The Mirror and the Mind: A History of Self-Recognition in the Human Sciences, by Katja Guenther
In The Mirror and the Mind, Katja Guenther traces the rich history of mirror experiments over the past 150 years. Clearly written and beautifully detailed, this book will be of interest to psychologists, neuroscientists and anthropologists at all levels of expertise interested in issues of self-recognition or misidentification between the self and other.
Working Papers
Drafts available on request
Commitment: From Hunting to Promising
I illustrate the transition between two forms of commitment in our evolutionary history: from pre-linguistic commitment, in the form of participation in group hunting among early hominins, to linguistic commitment, in the form of explicit promises. I show how group hunting changed our cooperative landscape and provided the selective environment for the evolution of a more effective commitment. That is, I show how commitment and cooperation coevolved.
Metatickles and Death in Damascus (under review)
Simon Huttegger has developed a version of deliberative decision theory that reconciles the prescriptions of the evidentialist and causalist decision theory. I extend this framework to problems characterised by decision instability, and show that it cannot deliver a resolute answer under a plausible specification of the independence dynamics. I prove that there exists a robust method of determining whether the specification of the independence dynamics matters for all two-state, two-act problems whose payoff tables exhibit some basic relationships.
The Role of Deliberation in Evidential and Causal Decision Theory
I address what role deliberation can play in the debate between evidential and causal decision theory. I conclude that deliberation here is best understood as characterising subjective normativity. This, however, presupposes an account of rationality aimed at the reasoning process and calls into question its applicability to the debate between evidential and causal decision theory, which is focused on evaluative, rather than prescriptive, normativity.
The Evolution of Commitment (with Jack VanDrunen and Jeffrey Barrett)
(under review)
We consider how two commitment might evolve with few cognitive resources in the context of an evolutionary game. We evaluate the relative success of commitment versus reliance on an unspoken convention for coordinating action in two games: one where the agents have a pre-existing language and one where they do not.
Dissertation Research
The Coevolution of Commitment and Cooperation
Many explanations for the evolution of cooperation have been offered by biologists and anthropologists ranging from kin selection, group selection, reciprocal altruism and cultural evolution. In my dissertation, I present a new hypothesis which is compatible with existing theories but draws our attention to a coevolutionary relationship in our history that has previously been overlooked -- the coevolution of commitment and cooperation. I show how different methods of undertaking commitments in our evolutionary history have enabled more sophisticated forms of cooperation over time which, in turn, create the selective environment for the evolution of increasingly effective commitments. I detail the emergence and consequences of four types of commitment: commitment in shared activity, explicit linguistic promising, implicit commitment via gossip, and institutionalised commitment.
Future Research
In future work in the philosophy of biology, I am interested in extending my research by (i) game-theoretic modeling of the evolution commitment; (ii) applying the theory of commitment to non-human organisms, and; (iii) investigating the cognitive preconditions for cooperation and, in particular, cultural norm psychology. In decision theory, I am interested in which idealisations are permissible in our normative theories and why.
